Practice-based conundrums and existentialist quandaries of a professional code of ethics by Williams, Izaak L, CSAC
Journal of Human Services: Training, Research, and Practice 
Volume 3 
Issue 1 Clarifying Ethical Practice with Clients 
and Supervisees 
Article 1 
2-2018 
Practice-based conundrums and existentialist quandaries of a 
professional code of ethics 
Izaak L. Williams CSAC 
University of Hawaii, izaakw@hawaii.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/jhstrp 
 Part of the Counseling Commons, Counseling Psychology Commons, Health Psychology Commons, 
Multicultural Psychology Commons, Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, School Psychology 
Commons, and the Sociology of Religion Commons 
Tell us how this article helped you. 
Recommended Citation 
Williams, Izaak L. CSAC (2018) "Practice-based conundrums and existentialist quandaries of a 
professional code of ethics," Journal of Human Services: Training, Research, and Practice: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , 
Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/jhstrp/vol3/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SFA ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Journal of Human Services: Training, Research, and Practice by an authorized editor of SFA ScholarWorks. For 
more information, please contact cdsscholarworks@sfasu.edu. 
 1 
Running HEAD: WHAT MAKES ADDICTION ETHICS CODES ETHICAL  
 
 
Practice-based conundrums and existentialist quandaries of a professional code of ethics 
 
     Abstract 
Ethical codes have long been considered indispensable tools in defining the proper conduct of 
counseling professionals. Revisions reflect the ideals of the industry to accommodate the 
evolving needs of clients and trends in treatment models, but the essence of the code is to convert 
principles befitting of the profession into concrete actions or considerations that abet professional 
decision-making. Acculturation into the profession involves ethics training intended to improve 
professionals’ ability to apply the code to situations that might arise in their practices, resulting 
in the most ethically appropriate action. However, such assumptions may be problematic. The 
idea of ethical competency and improvement in the code itself should be qualified to reflect the 
uncertainty of moral truths, including counselor training tailored to test competency, both before 
and during professional practice. In this article, the consideration that morals and ethics are 
distinct is spelled out and then challenged by drawing on Jean Paul Sartre’s existentialist critique 
of moral decision-making reality. In light of this critique and John Stuart Mill’s argument 
regarding the value of vigorous debate over philosophical ideas, suggestions are made regarding 
a potential approach to ethics competency education. 
 Keywords: ethics, counseling, licensure and certification, ethical decision making, code 
of conduct, philosophy 
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Professional ethics codes in the United States continue to evolve and become more 
elaborate (Behnke & Jones, 2012) to reflect changing times and articulate different meanings and 
cultural contexts (Walsh, 2015). Take for example the growing use of tele-counseling services 
and the ubiquitous technologies of this digital age (Addiction Technology Transfer Center 
Network, 2013) such as apps and virtual reality simulation systems. The newly revised code of 
ethics (COE) of the Association for Addiction Professionals and The National Certification 
Commission for Addiction Professionals (NAADAC, 2016), at twenty-one pages long, is 
drastically lengthened from previous versions. The overall growth and widespread acceptance of 
digital media in counseling and treatment services adds a whole new layer to the issue of ethical 
boundaries and self-disclosure. The evolution of professional codes of ethics in the United States 
also attempts to address ethical situations in a clear manner to obviate discussion about ethicality 
in concrete cases. One way this is achieved is by embedding clear-cut moral violations (e.g., no 
sex with clients) in the code of ethics to fetter the taking of liberties in professional conduct.  
 While “codified professional obligations cannot be fully explicit, precise, or 
straightforwardly applicable to every conceivable situation” (Martin, 2000, p. 136), without 
properly elucidated COEs counter arguments can ensue, in particular with respect to the legal 
contexts (Behnke & Jones, 2012). For example, 42 CFR Part 2 and HIPAA applications (federal 
laws that govern the practice of certain aspects of addiction treatment services and the protection 
of client confidentiality) provide a strict framework for appropriate disclosure.  COEs play a 
seemingly indispensable role in defining the parameters of the profession and holding 
practitioners accountable: 
Within the addiction and mental health counseling professions, codes of ethics 
represent consensus standards of conduct, reflecting the professions' aspirations, 
expectations and obligations. They are adopted and relied upon by licensing 
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boards, certification organizations, professional associations, and college and 
university graduate training programs. They serve to protect clients and others, 
educate the public, provide guidance to practitioners, provide a basis for 
regulatory oversight, and promote the profession's overall integrity (Hemingway 
& Querin, 2011, p. 18). 
 
 Hemingway and Querin (2011) go on to explain how these codes of ethics interface with 
the legal system—most notably, how COEs are not invoked in criminal matters (like billing for 
services not rendered) because they would be redundant. They are invoked, however, in civil 
cases of malpractice or in administrative actions by licensing/certification boards and 
professional associations against individuals/practices/agencies. By extension, legal concerns, 
about the legislative scope and consequences that relate to a counselor’s intended actions, may 
bolster reflective thinking and instruct future behavior perhaps more often than the COE.1   
However, boards and associations use COEs as both an educational tool and as a means 
of assessing and sanctioning professionals for ethics violations. Consequently, to some extent the 
code of ethics is liable to reductionist concepts of risk management and ethical interpretations 
that ultimately bend toward the ethics of risks or avoiding punishment for apparent wrongdoing. 
Hemingway and Querin (2011) asserted that 
clinicians cannot successfully carry out their fiduciary responsibilities to their 
clients or uphold the integrity of their professions without adhering to the ethical 
and moral principles that are found in their codes of ethics. These codes are not 
simply boilerplate documents that exist in the abstract. They are living, breathing 
documents with real-world implications, especially in the legal arena, that trigger 
a panoply of rights, responsibilities and consequences (p. 21). 
 
The issue with this conclusion is threefold: 1) where a COE can be brought to bear in penalizing 
misconduct, it is largely because there has been either a legal infractions or a relatively obvious 
                                                 
1 Ethical thinking grounded in intentions (e.g., Kantian deontology), rather than consequences, is hard to square with 
‘ethical’ thinking which seems primarily concerned with avoiding law suits (agencies) and getting fired 
(counselors). Such thinking calls into question the ‘virtue’ of being virtuous, or as Kant might put it, the moral worth 
of the action taken when the primary motivation is instrumental or in the best interest of the actor. Under this 
accounting of what makes ethics ethical, if the aim of the COE is avoiding negative consequences, it unwittingly 
undermines the values that it holds in high regard (Christie, Groarke, & Sweet, 2008). 
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indiscretion; 2) where a COE is intended to specify the moral and ethical constraints of the 
profession, it is largely a bureaucratic boilerplate document that exists only in the abstract—that 
is, it applies without practice understanding; and 3) no system of rules, however imbued with 
talk of principles and virtues, can overcome the highly theoretical nature of what makes 
something “the right thing to do”. The right thing to do typically resets on protecting and 
respecting the client and protecting the welfare of the public. COEs are more than risk 
assessment and may be a part of non-maleficence guidance but with much broader 
interpretations of client welfare, ethical conduct, and best practices. Yet, as a personal guide to 
professional conduct, they have both advantages and disadvantages in reinforcing the theoretical 
nature of what makes the right thing to do (see Table 1 in the appendix). 
 The strengths and limitations of ethical codes in general indicate how COEs needs to 
continue to evolve (see Table 1), in application to the addiction professional COE, and why it is 
important to engage in dialogue and expound upon questions germane to ethical codes (Smythe, 
2015). For instance, what knowledge must the provider possess to make the most ethical 
decisions possible with regard to their clients? What sort of training is sufficient to induce the 
ethical competence necessary to navigate reasonable ethical dilemmas? Suggesting answers to 
these questions can be helped by exploring the degree to which ethical dilemmas have 
definitively correct answers in the first place. Ultimately, the aim is to re-evaluate addiction 
ethical codes, and place an emphasis on the provision of ethics education. 
 Of course, there is a difference between “obvious” cases of wrongdoing (e.g., sex with a 
client) and the more typical issues that arise where the “correct” course of action seems to be a 
matter of weighing values and desired outcomes (e.g., discriminating against a client in judging 
the appropriateness of referral). In the analysis that follows, the idea that morals and ethics are 
4
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distinct is spelled out and then challenged by way of Jean Paul Sartre’s existentialist critique of 
moral decision-making reality. In light of this critique, and John Stuart Mill’s argument 
regarding the value of vigorous debate over philosophical ideas, suggestions are made regarding 
one approach to ethics education and competency for addiction professionals. This is followed 
by a brief overview of the addiction code of ethics; a discussion of the identity of the addiction 
profession and its interplay with the code of ethics; certain professional conundrums and ethical 
quandaries; and justification for the important distinction between morals and ethics.  
The Addiction Professional Code of Ethics: A Brief Telling 
 Formal addiction treatment is a relatively nascent allied health subspecialty that was only 
recently classified as a medical discipline (White, 2014a). Historian William L. White notes that  
 . . .ethical sensitivities and standards in addiction counseling have a very short history 
 (perhaps dating from the 1987 publication of Bissell and Royce’s Ethics for Addiction 
 Professionals) and have borrowed heavily from the disciplines of psychiatry, psychology 
 and social work. It is only recently that the field has begun to refine its ethical codes to 
 reflect the unique vulnerabilities of its clients, service providers and service institutions. 
 What the field has recognized is its power to do harm in the name of good, and it is that 
 awareness that is driving the heightened emphasis on ethical decision-making in 
 addiction counseling (White, 2004, p. 6).   
 
The NAADAC COE is devised by its respective committee or a consortium that may (or may 
not) be comprised of authorities, experts, academics, scholars, practitioners, and attorneys who 
write the overriding principles of safety into the accepted practices or standards of the counseling 
industry (White, 2014b), and thus can claim that any other action is a violation of ethics.  One 
thing to note about the NAADAC’s 2016 revised code of ethics is its heft. The code is so 
expansive that it risks outright contradiction and redundancy: after all, every proposition 
logically follows from a contradiction. In the section on Professional Responsibility and 
Workplace Standards (NAADAC, 2016), for example, the code directs addiction professionals to 
both eschew “any form of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit” (p. 8) and also to refrain from all “public 
5
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comments disparaging NAADAC or the addictions profession” (p. 10). While having a voice and 
trying to instill change is different than disparaging, truth is subjectively perceived no matter 
how well one’s professional voice carries the message of change. The takeaway is that when 
truth itself is taken as disparaging criticism, the professional’s voice is contradictory to the COE 
and cannot comport with both viewpoints. Moreover, there is “tension between provisions 
regarding whistle-blowing and employee loyalty and between peer review and criticism of 
colleagues” (Kultgen, 1988, p. 226), and no provision against an employer imposing penalties or 
reprisals as treatment programs are businesses not covered by the NAADAC code of ethics. 
Here, Kultgen (1988) noted, “where provisions conflict, they lack clear guidelines to determine 
which take priority . . . [thus] if the ethical stance of professions is to be improved, detailed codes 
clear and precise enough to read the same way to everyone must be developed” (pp. 226-227). 
Thus, it might be asked if a considerably pared-down code could be more useful by giving 
addiction professionals a more operative benchmark for professional conduct. 
 Moreover, within the counseling field, “everyday” counselors may or may not have a 
voice in terms of ethical revisions. This is important because the cultural environment in which 
clinicians practice may exert tremendous pressure and influence upon ethical conduct. Therefore, 
programs—that is, executive directors, board members, managers and supervisors—have a moral 
responsibility to “fortify the ethical individual, bolster ethical reasoning, nourish dialogue, and 
inject ethical concerns into routine operations” (Lewis & Gilman, 2005, p. 247). This may 
involve forging systems, policy, procedures, standards, informal systems (values, norms, 
behaviors, forces and pressures), and use of appropriate language and tone in describing ethical 
transgressions. Such ethics would also be infused into staff hiring, firing, promoting, and 
demoting. 
6
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 A concern is that ethics breaches are traditionally thought of on a clinical-individual level 
(i.e., blame is rapidly placed on individual “bad apples”). But blame might be better focused on 
ethical standards in COEs and program policies and procedures that are narrowly focused on 
clinical roles without addressing issues involving the demeanor of all staff members within the 
organizational hierarchy (i.e., a bad “barrel” of apples) (White, 1997). COEs challenge the 
behavior of individuals, not systemic failings or tensions. 
 At the same time, the NAADAC code of ethics confidently lists numerous policies 
regarding informed consent, non-discrimination, confidentiality and its limits, the dangers of 
dual relationships, the explicit prohibition of sexual relations with current and former clients, the 
expectation of clinical competency and referral when necessary in virtue of a client’s needs, and 
many more similar requirements and prohibitions (NAADAC, 2016). However, many of these 
policies use hedge-words and phrases, like “Providers shall take reasonable precautions to…” 
and “shall make every effort to…” and “shall consider the inherent risks and benefits associated 
with…” (NAADAC, 2016, p. 3).  Some flexibility in policies is obviously necessary given the 
reality of addiction treatment. For instance, in certain circumstances, waiting to obtain informed 
consent from a client who is visibly impaired is appropriate, as making life choices for a client 
with an alcohol addiction disorder smelling of alcohol would require their competence and self-
awareness. However, in such circumstances, the code flexibly informs providers that they 
“recognize the need to balance the ethical rights of clients to make choices about their treatment, 
their capacity to give consent to receive treatment-related services, and 
parental/familial/representative legal rights, and responsibilities to protect the client and make 
decisions on their behalf” (NAADAC, 2016, pp. 2-3).    
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Moreover, clients transition to a particular level of care, transfer to another program, or 
are administratively discharged (AD)/forced termination (for discussion on AD see White, Scott, 
Dennis, & Boyle, 2005; Williams, 2015a; 2015b; 2016; Williams & Taleff, 2015; Williams & 
White, 2015), not uncommonly without full knowledge about other treatments and their right to 
choose alternatives. This undermines the rhetoric and importance given to informed consent in 
other areas of practice. As Abramson (1981) noted, “equally important is a recognition on the 
part of these professions that even a firmly adhered to code of ethics does not protect one from 
daily confrontations with ethics and value dilemmas, particularly in health care settings where 
crises, diminishing resources, and rapidly advancing technologies highlight competing interests” 
(p. 34; citing Rehr, 1978).  
 Furthermore, in addition to lack of practical practice understanding, the COE consortium 
does not offer clear articulation of how its professional code of ethics was transmuted from 
(intuitive, unsystematic) clinical practice in terms of the evidence (or what constitutes evidence), 
nor does it supply references used to support the concepts, values, principles, and assertions of 
the COE.  The processes of creating the COE are largely unknown, especially in terms of rigor of 
assessment, how evidence and references are prioritized and evaluated, the generalizability of 
data, and how currently relevant is its literature. 
 The theory underlining the concepts in the COE are also unexplained and raise many 
questions. Does the COE require, for example, a Rawlsian (1971) conceptualization of justice in 
which fairness implores the counselor to put a premium on assessing and privileging the most 
disadvantaged in a situation and acting on behalf of that person (Abramson, 1981)? At what level 
of impact (clinical, client, agency, society, stakeholder, family) ought a counselor have primary 
obligation to reject consequentialism (Mill) and utilitarianism in weighing the ethical principle of 
8
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client autonomy? Is it better to defend ethical arguments without utilitarian justification? Is the 
endgame for all what makes an action ultimately right, whether this is supported by the COE or 
relegates it to a tertiary role? Maybe it would be possible to reject an ethics framework that aims 
to prevent negative consequences while accepting Aristotle's idea that ethics in general equates 
goodness and virtue with fulfillment. How information is sifted, filtered, and weighed in value 
therefore seems problematic. As a result, certain directives or implicit instructions offered by the 
COE, which one might expect to be empirically supported literature-based assertions and legal 
standards, appear to be based on unsupported professional opinion taken from experiential 
experience, canned ideology, or dogma (e.g., see discussion by Zur, 2005, on dual relationships).  
With the underpinning logic supporting the construction of COEs appearing opaque and 
difficult to recognize or pin down, professionals may question the rational justification for COEs 
suggesting one action over another, and they may not easily absorb content or application of the 
codes without knowing the moral and ethical basis of its assertions (Behnke, 2005). For example, 
what ethical theories (e.g., human rights) are used to bear on ethical lines of thought, and their 
endorsements and proscriptions, aside from a “principalis” or “principle-based” ethic? There are 
many possible alternatives, which include ecological ethics, relational (cultural) ethics, ethics of 
care or a feminist-based approach, pragmatism, virtue ethics, humanist, cognitive-behavioral, 
communicative ethics.  
 Counselors may believe that COEs offer the right ethical answers, which are reinforced 
and cemented in training and supervision. Yet the professional code of ethics may be at odds 
with “doing the right thing” in the moral sense. Moral principles underlying the COE may 
represent universal phenomena or moral absolutes in counseling practice. For example, 
counselors have a prima facie moral obligation to remain in a state of virtuous ignorance (e.g., by 
9
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not participating in gossip about clients or prying into client charts to satisfy unprofessional 
personal curiosity). However, certain codes of ethics may imply that the COE should be followed 
for the sake of conformity, to minimize legal risks, or to avoid disciplinary action from 
institutional bodies. For example, the Hawaii State Certified Substance Abuse Counselor Code of 
Ethics (Alcohol and Drug Abuse Division, 1995)—a permutation of the NAADAC COE— 
enjoins counselors to embody empathy as an essential skill in professional practice. Yet there is 
not enough information provided to explain why they should do so. This paradigm assumes that 
empathy should be a crucial fundamental of the ethical decision-making process despite 
legitimately contested dialogue to the contrary, which warns about discriminatory empathizing, 
emotionally laden cognitive distortion effects, and empathy-inducing compassion fatigue and 
provider burnout (e.g., see Bloom, 2016). Moreover, there is no clear definition suggested as to 
what empathy and compassion comprise. There also doesn’t appear to be enough contextual 
standardization in meaning and measurement, let alone a basis for employee performance 
evaluation, within the extant addiction counseling literature base and counseling field to make a 
convincing case for dispensing empathy into ethical decision-making.     
 Importance of Professional Identity of Addiction Counselors to COEs 
 The professional identity of the addiction counselor profession is rooted in the witnessed 
potential for long-term addiction recovery and the belief that the addiction counselor and allied 
professionals can play important supportive roles achieving recovery for individuals, families, 
and communities (White, 2014b). 
 How certain codes are interpreted and adopted in practice rests in part on how counselors 
conceive of their job. One counselor conceived his role as trying, “to help get all the other voices 
out of the way for the clients, so they can hear their own and begin to have some faith in it” 
10
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(Jennings, Sovereign, Bottorff, Mussell, & Vye, 2005, p. 115). The flexible approach of that 
professional to practice standards clearly accepted the realities faced by clients in treatment 
while also crediting the importance of client autonomy for achieving change. This realistic 
approach acknowledges that chronic and severe mental/health disorder (i.e., drug addiction as a 
phenomenon standing as a cluster of distinct symptoms) may initially impair client capacity to 
appreciate choices and hamper their ability to exercise autonomy (Satel & Lilienfeld, 2016; 
Volkow, Koob, & McLellan, 2016). Nevertheless, a counselor moved by respect for autonomy 
will recognize a client’s inherent right to see the world differently and to make decisions of their 
own about how to live (Taleff, 2006). In contrast, if a counselor conceives his or her role as 
having a heavy paternalist flavor2— as a parent to an “adult child”—this enables unilateral 
decisions to be made on behalf of the client, however temporarily, and forestalls the client’s 
autonomy (commonly regarded as a moral cornerstone of ethics) by implying the counselor has 
the right to make decisions for the client.   
 From an ethical perspective, such action cuts against the grain of ideas in the counseling 
profession. Whether the counselor conceptualizes addiction as a brain disease, a moral choice, 
maladaptive behavior, or otherwise, will inform his or her decision-making and ethical rationale. 
For example, the notion that drug addiction is purely choice may lead counselors to advocate 
hardline approaches to program rule infractions and harsh consequences such as administrative 
discharge or forced termination (Williams, 2016). Thus, it is incumbent upon the professional to 
keep in mind the client’s potentially impaired autonomy (particularly under the influence) while 
simultaneously balancing beneficence, paternalism, and autonomy (among other principles) so 
                                                 
2 Nowadays paternalism is ripe with negative connotation; though a form of beneficence, it is often conceived to 
denounce a counselor’s action and directly assert or covertly allege violation of a moral rule and the denying or 
rejecting of the client’s good. While codes recognize client autonomy as a central ethical obligation and value, 
interestingly enough, “provisions protecting the client from exploitation are more definite than those prohibiting 
paternalistic encroachments on autonomy” (Kultgen, 1988, p. 232). 
11
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that one ethical principle is not ideologically or dogmatically believed to be absolute and 
privileged with primacy in decision-making irrespective of the situation.   
With regard to professional identity in the counseling profession, for example, 
Handelsman, Gottlieb, and Knapp (2005) proposed an ethical acculturation model based on the 
original work of Berry (1980), concluding that ethics training and clinical supervision might be 
optimized to help counselors integrate their own values and identity within the professional value 
systems. The ultimate goal is for the counselor to embrace an integrated adaptation strategy. 
Here, integration involves the clinician forming a deep relationship with the professional context 
and culture (role duties, values, virtues of justice and honesty, etc.) in a way that synergistically 
reinforces the sincerity of both personal and professional identities. In other words, becoming a 
true professional goes beyond mere certification or licensing, but requires a strength of 
commitment to the professional ideal and self-reflection that sees its virtues incorporated into 
one’s character (Knapp, Gottlieb, & Handelsman, 2017; Kultgen, 1988).  In their summary of 
findings, Handelsman et al. (2005) believed integrated acculturation into the counseling 
profession could improve ethical decision-making, and they float the possibility of incorporating 
an acculturation model of ethics training into the process of educating counselors.  
 Professional Conundrums and Ethical Quandaries in Practice 
In “The Dark Side of Professional Ethics,” Knapp, Handelsman, Gotlieb, and 
VandeCreek (2013) illustrate a number of scenarios in which ethical conflicts arise. The 
following is one example: 
A psychologist was treating a medical student suffering from anxiety and loneliness. The 
student learned from another source that a local church sponsored an organization for 
young singles which was open to members of the community who were not members of 
the church. The psychologist discouraged the student from joining this group because the 
psychologist was a member of that church and there was a possibility, albeit remote, that 
12
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her patient could become more involved in the church and that their paths might 
eventually cross (p. 374). 
 
According to Knapp et al. (2013), the therapist interpreted the code without any clearly specific 
ethical decision-making model employed, at the expense of “prudence” and “compassion” (p. 
374). While the scenario’s limited information is inadequate to fully illustrate the therapist’s 
interpretation of the situation or determine the framing of her decision-making model, there is 
enough information to reveal a dilemma for the therapist on the basis of commitments to various 
principles including confidentiality. Here the COE enjoins counselors to avoid dual relationships, 
that is, relationships outside the context of clinician and client. 
 Consider another type of scenario in which a client on parole is dealing drugs to pay for 
rent on transition housing in outpatient addiction treatment. The client intends to make enough 
money this way to remain housed and meet additional expenses not covered by insurance, one of 
which is child care. This behavior may both represent a possible addiction-related flare-up and 
risks resumption of drug use requiring continued treatment and legal sanction, but also puts the 
client at risk of losing access to housing and treatment, not to mention legal consequences. Any 
responsible counselor in this case faces a potential ethical dilemma of his or her own because the 
code enjoins clinicians to make decisions for the well-being and health of clients, to keep client 
identity and information confidential, and “to accurately, honestly and objectively report to 
appropriate third parties, including parole boards” (NAADAC, 2016, p. 11). At first glance, there 
might appear to be a clear-cut answer to the counselor’s dilemma: maintain respect for client 
autonomy/self-determination and confidentiality under the banner of beneficence. This is the 
view of Counselor A, who knows that the client is selling drugs, but does not recognize this as 
presenting a dilemma. Breaking the requirement for client confidentiality is a legal breach and 
ethical offence itself and must only be for reasons described in HIPAA Privacy Rule and 42 CFR 
13
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Part 2 (i.e., medical emergencies, immediate threat to the health of safety/others related to a 
crime on program premises, child abuse or neglect, court order, etc.), unless other reasons are 
agreed as reportable under client consent (SAMHSA, 2016). Although the client in this example 
is engaging in criminal offending and violation of parole, Counselor A sees this as outside their 
professional liability of action to the extent of notifying the criminal justice system. But more 
importantly, consent forms signed at the start of treatment may not accurately reflect at present 
the client’s power of choice to knowingly provide consent to the disclosure. Thus, Counselor A 
conceptualizes the meaning of client consent as a process that doesn’t overstep the client. This 
counselor may encourage the client to consider his or her actions within contexts of counseling 
and treatment planning, but may not take any further action of their own. Counselor B agrees that 
information released to third parties is clearly defined in the client consent-to-release information 
form and is typically limited to diagnoses, treatment planning, and compliance. But believes that 
compliance reports made to the client’s parole officer (third party) should default to any-and-all 
information that the parole officer and judicial system would want to know in order to establish 
compliance with the court’s terms of parole. This is because Counselor B stresses the importance 
of truth-telling and transparency in relationship to addiction recovery and in developing and 
sustaining a mutually healthy provider rapport and therapeutic alliance. Counselor A understands 
compliance reports may indeed include additional information but only the minimum further 
information should be disclosed if necessary. Counselor A therefore defaults to a stringent 
reading of 42 CFR and HIPAA, places a premium on client autonomy, and considers the drug 
dealing a treatment issue for all potentially affected clients to be addressed therapeutically. 
Counselor B has a more inclusive view of the risk of harm to be a great threat to the health and 
14
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safety of other clients in treatment, especially those living in the same recovery residence or 
“clean and sober house” as well as clients attending the same outpatient treatment program.   
 A counselor in the above predicament must weigh compelling and conflicting principles, 
but the principles recommended by the COE do not appear to help. Does the situation warrant 
respect for client autonomy and confidentiality over what might be an issue of safety? Or does 
not reporting the incident constitute a moral failure on the part of the counselor by overvaluing 
client autonomy to the point where client accountability and responsibility are (legally) 
disavowed. Here it can surely be argued from the nature of addiction counseling that a counselor 
is not immediately obligated in the name of justice to report to legal authorities every infraction 
concerning where or when their clients may illegally obtain or use their choice of illicit drugs.
 Justice is a virtue that directs a moral agent to treat persons fairly and equally in a 
profession that also demands great care in establishing boundaries. Is justice then compatible 
with, for example, a clinical supervisor discouraging a counselor from attending AA meetings 
that are also attended by clients, especially when the client perceives his or her counselor’s 
presence at their AA home group as intrusive? Is it ethical if the supervisor is trying to help the 
counselor avoid a possible breach of confidentiality or harmful bias effects from information 
divulged by the client in AA meetings and carried by the counselor into the clinical setting? Yet 
multiple relationships in-and-of themselves are not an infraction of ethics as the codes allows for 
boundary crossings. So, what does justice really mean here and what is its exact nature if it 
requires curtailing the counselor’s needs?    
 No doubt justice makes its way into the code as a directive to treat all clients fairly and 
equally. It arguably follows from this that one ought not (unfairly) discriminate, for example, on 
the basis of race or sex when agreeing to provide care. But is it unjust to discriminate on the 
15
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basis of, say, a client’s proclivity to propound racist and misogynistic ideology even if it isn’t 
directly threatening to the counselor? When does the counselor’s self-interest (“To protect 
yourself and your personal interests”) (NAADAC, 2016, p. 2) override directives to help others 
(beneficence) and allow them to choose their own destinies (autonomy)? If the counselor harbors 
personal prejudices against sex offenders and lacks the capacity to establish a therapeutic 
alliance with the client, the counselor should not have an ethical obligation to work with the 
client. Though the code of ethics provides guidelines on what constitutes appropriately respectful 
behaviors as covered in ethical codes, this dilemma is an ethically gray matter. Client autonomy 
demands that counselors are under ethical obligation to respect the client (while reserving their 
own autonomy). With this, the ethical thing to do is for the counselor to try and work through the 
self-conflict (e.g., seek supervision).  
 However, a counter argument can be made to not work with the client in accordance with 
the NAADAC codes. To refer the client because of said conflict is not a paternalistic act or 
imposition of values but a decision based on practical and pragmatic concerns of the counselor to 
maintain a therapeutic stance with the client that comes as close as possible to unconditional 
positive regard. This would seem to resonate with client rights and reflect prudent due diligence 
of knowing one’s own limitations, competency, and fidelity to the duty of care. The reaction of 
the counselor for which the client challenges the development and integrity of a therapeutic 
alliance is not necessarily a (countertransference) psychological reaction or easily corrected by 
means of cognitive restructuring, as if simply due to faulty, irrational reasoning and false beliefs.  
Even a client-centered definition of autonomy would seem amenable to supporting the 
counselor’s clinical judgment and in knowing his or her deontological limits. Here then it is 
appropriate to action a client referral with a notice that the client should see a better-suited 
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counselor, who—if need be—may challenge the client in an ethically and therapeutically 
grounded manner if the client’s viewpoints cause the new counselor distress. A practitioner 
subject to the COE can reasonably be perplexed by the selection of principles that make their 
way into the code, how these principles work in supporting the requirements they are intended to 
support, and how they ought to be weighed when faced with a dilemma where reasonable 
principles seem in conflict.  
    Ethics Versus Morals 
 
Whenever talk arises of doing the right thing, distinction may arise between ethics and 
morals. Yet, in everyday discourse, it is difficult to peel these two notions apart. Dictionary 
definitions variously treat these concepts as being mutually dependent, overlapping, or identical. 
But in arguments where ethics and morals play a role—like those here—a more useful 
distinction is needed. Thus, the following explication is provisionally adopted: 
Ethics and morals relate to “right” and “wrong” conduct. While they are 
sometimes used interchangeably, they are different: ethics refer to rules provided 
by an external source, e.g., codes of conduct in workplaces or principles in 
religions. Morals refer to an individual’s own principles regarding right and 
wrong (Diffen, 2016, para. 1).  
 
According to this distinction, ethics may be imposed, as in a COE that one must agree to adopt in 
the course of certification or licensure for a particular title; whereas morals are more or less 
consistent personal attitudes about right and wrong. As such, one’s moral convictions may be in 
conflict with one’s ethical obligations at any given time (Teo, 2015). If, for example, a certified 
counselor is held by a COE to “not practice, condone, facilitate, or collaborate with any form of 
discrimination against any client on the basis of race, ethnicity, color, religious or spiritual 
beliefs, age, gender identification, national origin, sexual orientation or expression, marital 
status, political affiliations, physical or mental handicap, health condition, housing status, 
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military status, or economic status” (NAADAC, 2016, p. 2),  yet that counselor finds the ideas of 
homosexuality, transgenderism, and gay marriage morally unacceptable, then there is a potential 
conflict for this person between ethics and morals.  
 Such conflicts might be dismissed as a kind of ethical (or logical) error because the 
notion of consensus standards of conduct has an air of objectivity about it. One may be tempted 
to talk of codes of ethics as attempts to depict the correct set of morals for the duties of the 
profession. Indeed, while ethics codes are considered to be aspirational in message and serve as a 
framework for acceptable practice, it is commonplace to find claims that COEs discount ethical 
codes themselves: that is, that they act to sort possible moral convictions into those that do 
bestow honor upon the person or profession from those that do not, or as Hatcher (2010) put it, 
“Codes of ethics tend to be idealistic and are a statement of the behaviors to which a profession 
aspires” (para. 4). Accordingly, in the example of a morals-versus-ethics conflict, the counselor 
who refers a sex offender to a different program or to alternative resources that purport to help as 
a form of treatment might face sanctions for unethical conduct, even if said counselor has 
personal moral reasons for taking this initiative. The potential for reprimand conveys the fact that 
some morals don’t make the cut for being a “good” (i.e., virtuous) certified or licensed 
counselor. 
 The implication is that when one is sufficiently acculturated into the profession, which 
includes its code of ethics, all professional members operate from the same prescribed set of 
standards. Hence, professional associations concern themselves not only with establishing the 
COE but also with the best means of inculcating the “right” values in its members, since 
professional education and certification come well after one has established a moral code of 
one’s own (Knapp & VandeCreek, 2006).  
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 This suggestion presupposes the idea that students’ moral attitudes should improve after 
ethics training. Such expectation of improvement also presupposes there is a definite answer to 
whether certain scenarios amount to moral or ethics violations. Of course, ethics does not always 
provide one single, correct answer to conflicting issues and so two thoughtfully articulated 
answers can be better (e.g. an improvement), even if neither one is definitely right.  There is a 
reason for such gray areas existing in the codes—and that is to respect the context and 
individuality of the specific situation. But we can still ask: On what grounds can a supposition be 
made that there is a single answer to ethics issues and that more ethics training can help tease 
that answer out? This is an important question because studies across professions that use COEs 
focus on examining what sort of training “improves students’ ethical attitudes” and how far it 
can result in professionals “actually acting in a more ethical manner” (Cameron & O'Leary, 
2015, p. 278). Does such training introduce a set of shared principles that guide the ethical 
decisions of so-called master therapist in the field (Jennings et al., 2005)? Can it resolve whether 
the virtues characteristic of ethical agents are more or less important than principles or rules 
(morals) to which one commits (Meara, Schmidt, & Day, 1996)? 
 But this is an age-old problem in a discipline that goes back at least as far as Plato (i.e., 
what determines the right thing to do? It cannot simply be law, since we can hold, as Gandhi did, 
that some laws are unjust and should be resisted, flouted, and (or) abandoned. Similarly, it 
cannot be cultural norms, since these can alter over time, as we see with institutions like slavery 
or marriage that are abandoned or reformed in the name of moral progress. Nor can it simply be 
the principles deemed objectively true by the individual who holds them, since this sort of 
relativism flies in the face of almost universal injunctions against many acts, such as murder and 
child abuse, for example. 
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 Indeed, the farther we get from obvious cases of wrongdoing (such as misrepresentation 
of credentials, false advertising, over-billing, sexual and other types of exploitation, etc.), the 
more trouble we have justifying an action, from any theoretical perspective, as either absolutely 
right or absolutely wrong. Yet, in spite of hedge-phrases used in COEs (as noted earlier), and the 
clear necessity of latitude in judgment given the nature and reality of addiction treatment, 
knowledge of objective moral truths is precisely what is expected of members bound by codes of 
ethics. 
  Our Existentialist Quandary: Whose Code is “The” Code? 
 Practitioners may espouse (or feign) allegiance to the COE and pay lip service to it while 
simultaneously endorsing another code (based on personal values and grounded in practice 
experience) when confronted with problematic situations (Van Hoose & Kottler, 1985). This 
distinction between “espoused theories” and “theories-in-use” was originally made by Argyris 
and Schon (1974) to describe the incongruence between ethical theory and practice (Van Hoose 
& Kottler, 1985). As first illustration of this, we can imagine that counselors might agree on the 
importance of client follow-up after a client misses a treatment session or is discharged. Yet 
actual professional practice may indicate the such follow-ups lack value as few clients receive 
this evidence-based prescribed treatment. Similar points could be drawn about other differences 
between ethical requirements and professional practice (Van Hoose & Kottler, 1985).   
 Second, in addition to the formal norms and rules that standardize behaviors, there exists 
the presence and use of “informal norms”, though harder to identity.  These are “embedded in the 
stories employees tell, the euphemisms they use, the socialization methods they encounter, and 
the informal enforcement of norms felt and heard and seen as true values of the organization” 
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011, pp. 122-123).  Such informal cultures may either reinforce or 
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eschew certain ethical behavior, raising a number of implications and concerns. For example, 
does the underlying cultural subsystem of the organization counteract the code of ethics? Here, 
what is (or is not) informally talked about in the corridors of the agency—at informal de facto 
staff meetings, behind closed doors in the supervisor and executive director offices, and in 
exclusive boardroom conferences—is as significant for practice culture, or more so, than formal 
policy and procedures (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). This informal culture reveals the true 
hidden values and morals that are encouraged, rewarded, and socially reinforced. For example, 
the executive director of a treatment program vaunting about working 12 hour days, or the 
clinical operations director announcing he hasn’t taken a vacation in twelve months, are 
testaments to their loyalty and commitment to their job. However, though not directly 
communicated, the subtext is an expression of the agency’s “hidden” ethics code and implies 
(even encourages) poor work boundaries and scant concern for healthy self-care. The message, 
conveyed by those wielding administrative power, suggests that this is “the right thing to do”, 
with expectations that others should follow.  
 Third, regulation of all counselor behavior is based entirely on a belief system concerning 
what is right for a particular client. Since the core of a counselor’s system of what is right and 
wrong, good and bad, effective and ineffective, appropriate and inappropriate is based on a 
philosophical ethical system. Recalling the distinction between “espoused theories” and 
“theories-in-use”, it is important to note the qualitative difference between “attitudinal morality” 
and “behavioral morality”, as reflected in divergence between what we actually believe, what we 
claim we believe, and how we act on our beliefs (Van Hoose & Kottler, 1985, p. 25).  
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Is it then reasonable to suppose that any ethics code or ethics education can teach 
professionals to choose correctly—in the face of ethical dilemmas or in responding to 
questions—when there seems an impossibility of one correct view? In “Existentialism is a 
Humanism” (Sartre, 1975), Jean-Paul Sartre observed that in the face of ethical dilemmas, there 
is no objective truth upon which one could rely to generate the right course of action. We are 
each, in his words, “condemned to be free”—that is, we have no choice but to make a choice. 
And the choice we make, if authentic, is recognized as both a personal value judgment and an 
imposition of that value on the rest of humanity. 
 In Sartre’s (1975) reckoning of our moral situation, persons are at all times in this state of 
duality: subjected to the values of others, yet choosing whether to accept or reject them. If a 
person believes he must act according to the moral code of his religion, for example, this is in 
effect his personal endorsement of a value system imposed from outside, which becomes in that 
moment of endorsement a value system imposed on the world from inside. It is the latter 
judgment, necessary to action, that makes externally imposed ethics a myth. All value is chosen. 
The ramifications of Sartre’s (1975) argument are hard to accept, but the argument itself 
is compelling. Sartre (1975) recounts the story of a man trying to decide between staying home 
at the request of his mother or joining the French resistance to fight the advancement of Nazi 
occupation. On the one hand, his mother’s request is morally compelling in light of his 
obligation to her and the real protection and comfort he might provide her by staying. On the 
other hand, fighting Nazism is morally urgent too. Where the man can do the most good is much 
less certain. If the man consults another for advice—a priest, a philosopher, a clairvoyant, a 
military recruiter—whatever advice he gets he can choose to heed or not. The same may be said 
for any method he might employ to help him decide, right down to asking for a sign or flipping a 
22
Journal of Human Services: Training, Research, and Practice, Vol. 3 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/jhstrp/vol3/iss1/1
 23 
coin—signs must be interpreted, and coin flips can be rejected (two out of three?). An interesting 
detail of Sartre’s (1975) use of his example is that even the people from whom we solicit advice 
are chosen on the basis of what we expect they will say. And gut-level instincts about what one 
ought to do are similarly challenging to external authority, since the whole notion of being a 
moral agent is contingent upon the ability to override instincts, biases, and social conditioning to 
make a better choice. The freedom to choose is thus a necessary condition of morality, and the 
bane of those who wish for universal moral progress. 
 Sartre’s (1975) example is relevant here because it characterizes something important 
about the kinds of ethical decisions that addiction professionals face. Rarely does one deliberate 
over the ethicality of over-billing or asking a client out on a date—these wrongs are just obvious 
and warrant strict sanctions. But the question of how to educate addiction professionals such that 
they improve their ethical decision-making dispositions centers on issues where, as Reamer 
(2012) put it, “in the final analysis, reasonable, thoughtful, and principled practitioners may 
disagree” (para. 14).  
 According to Sartre (1975), these disagreements do not have an objective settlement 
procedure, even from an omniscient perspective. There is no superseding value, or character 
trait, or piece of knowledge that can determine a decision about whether, for example, it is best 
to disclose relevant personal information (like being a former “addict”) in order to foster safe 
communication with a client, or withhold such information in order to avoid the risk of shifting 
the focus of attention from client to counselor. Yes, the counselor must make the choice in light 
of all the contextual knowledge she can muster, but ultimately, the decision is hers; and like 
Sartre’s (1975) example, it is a choice between values that are on an ethical par—that is, neither 
is blatantly harmful to either party and both are professionally defensible. Therefore, the idea of 
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ethical improvement should be qualified. What we want is improvement in the degree to which 
practitioners engage critically with the expectations proposed in their COE, in discussion with 
their peers and supervisors about what is best, given the context and the values at play from a 
professional standpoint as well as a personal one. Conclusions of this sort of deliberation would 
be considered “authentic decisions”, following Sartre (1975), when a reasoned and informed 
choice is made to value one thing over another in recognition of the truth that all such decisions 
are made from the inside and imposed on others. 
 Our moral situation is thus starkly opposed to the assumption that there is a genuine 
distinction between ethics and morals where morals are personal attitudes regarding right and 
wrong and ethics are externally imposed ideals. All values are both imposed and then chosen, 
chosen and thus imposed. But such decisions do not belong to the few—that handful of lawyers 
and experts, for example, that bring together the principles and specifics of the COE. Ethical 
decisions confront everyone, and no code—neither external nor internal—can definitively decide 
how those decisions ought to go. 
Deliberate Practice and Vigorous Debate: The Path to Ethical “Progress” 
 Because there has not been any study in the U.S. from which to source ethics complaints 
lodged against addiction counselors, this area of study is overwhelmingly incomplete. Since 
there is no standardized set of data, no definitive ranking or even identification of the most 
common grievances, it is impossible to assign rank order to ethical transgressions (Knapp & 
VandeCreek, 2006). To date, the most recent and comprehensive study on ethics violations in the 
substance use disorder field comes from St. Germaine (1997) covering the years 1990 and 1991. 
National survey data was collected from 40 state drug and alcohol counselor certification boards 
in the United States representing 32,991 certified addiction counselors with a total sample of 372 
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ethics complaints gathered (a return rate of 74.5 percent). Of these complaints, 285 were 
subsequently investigated, 98 were dismissed, and 87 were left pending. The most common 
ethics complaints were: 1) dual relationships (sexual/social/friend/financial/business) with 
current and former clients (28.49%, n = 106); 2) incompetence in the counseling 
relationship/unable to practice with skills and safety due to alcohol or drug/mental/or other 
condition (12.37%, n = 46); 3) practicing without proper certification (9.95%, n = 37); and, 4) 
breach of confidentiality (8.33%, n = 31).  
Van Hoose and Kottler (1985) claim “the majority of ethics violations result not from a 
willful disregard of professional codes, but rather from ignorance and poor judgment” (p. 10). 
While no known study to date verifies that claim, St. Germaine’s (1997) research offers some 
evidential contribution to the noticeable dearth and obsolescence of addiction counseling 
literature. While St. Germaine (1997) recommends more ethics training, the nature of these 
ethics violations may say more about human foibles inherent to human nature. Further, 
introducing people to COEs doesn’t necessarily change a counselor’s personal ethical and moral 
standards. COEs don’t guarantee safeguards or cultivate ethical responsibility; nor do they 
transmit depth of conviction, moral courage, or understanding of values and principles (Van 
Hoose & Kottler, 1985). If anything, St. Germaine’s study calls into question the claim that the 
COE is a device based on the assumption or belief that the etiology of ethics breaches is a 
function of excusable ignorance of ethics codes (Van Hoose & Kottler, 1985). The more 
egregious violations stemming from fraud, exploitation of clients and carrying out sexual affairs 
with them, for example, appear more suggestive of willful disregard and poor judgment (as an 
outgrowth of moral character and personality of the staff member involved) than ignorance of the 
specific ethics code or incompetence per se. However, as White (2005) noted about the specific 
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violation of staff breaking professional barriers to sexual involvement with clients, relationship 
over-involvement or “boundary drift” (p. 547) may be a more useful heuristic construct to 
represent the preponderance of counselor–client sexual intimacy type cases. According to White 
(2005), warning signs indicative of early boundary drift include many often-successive steps 
such as resisting supervision, courtship behaviors, increased one-to-one session duration, 
resistance to referral, sexualizing content, and possessiveness of client. Thus, poorly defined 
boundaries between counselor/program staff and client can be conceptually understood as a 
process issue that can progressively culminate in sexual intimacies. As such, counselor self-
monitoring and good supervision may obviate a good deal of cases of counselor–client 
enmeshment so that warning signs of boundary drift are swiftly flagged (White, 2005).  
How then do we address the need to educate addiction professionals in the fine art of 
ethical thinking? Some decisions are more authentic, and more reasonable in light of contextual 
features of the situation and the values that must be weighed in relation to these. John Stuart Mill 
(1869) famously defended the principle of freedom of thought and expression on the grounds 
that the suppression of (nearly) any speech carried risks that far outweighed the “pain” of hearing 
offensive and/or false speech. His argument was that the suppressed speech could be true, false, 
or somewhere in between. If the suppressed speech is true, we suppress it at our peril as truth-
seekers, and in so doing we presume our own infallibility. If the suppressed speech contains part 
of the truth, again we suppress it at our peril as truth-seekers (Mill, 1869). The interesting case is 
suppressed speech that is false, which provokes the question: should truth-seekers tolerate 
falsehoods? 
 Mill (1869) argued that false speech plays an important role in our appreciation of the 
truth. Unless truth is vigorously and openly contested, truth is held as mere dogma, losing its 
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vivacity and power. His idea was that persons in possession of some truth must also understand 
the grounds of that truth—the reasons and evidence it has in its favor. The ground of truth fades 
as it becomes common knowledge, until its truth is no longer appreciated as a philosophical 
achievement. Only by facing contestation—speech that calls into question its veracity—does a 
person hold onto the grounds of truth that are needed to quell critics and build knowledge on the 
basis of that truth. 
 Mill’s (1896) argument assists our approach to codes of ethics and ethics training in its 
relation to Sartre’s (1978) assessment of our moral situation—that ethical decision-making at 
best occurs in a realm of uncertainty and fallibility. Like the sorts of political statements that Mill 
(1869) was interested in, moral conclusions are philosophical conclusions: they cannot be proved 
like theorems of logic or mathematics; they must be argued for on the basis of reasons and 
evidence, principles and facts. And reasonable people can and do come to different conclusions. 
We should therefore teach ethical decision-making from this perspective: the vivacity and 
power of any ethical “truth” (value-choice may be a better word) depends on understanding its 
ground, which upholds its place and worth only in light of its rivals. Instruction therefore might 
look more like structured debate than lectures on codes and exercises in application. For, if 
anything can be gleaned from the literature on the failure of students and counselors to improve 
through ethics training, it is that perhaps the very notion of a “correct answer” is a mistake 
(Taleff, 2010). Nevertheless, the process whereby authentic decisions are made must be 
cultivated in professionals at every level, and not merely during education and credentialing. At 
the professional level, there is perhaps no better way to hone these skills than what Reamer 
(2012) calls “deliberate practice” (following use of the term by Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-
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Römer, 1993). Deliberate practice is distinct from the kind of practice that predicts progress 
simply from logging time. As Reamer (2012) stated: 
the distinguishing factor [of deliberate practice] is the practitioner deliberately, 
purposefully, and mindfully seeking out new challenges to enhance his or her expertise in 
ways that require sharp concentration and real effort. Those who become true experts do 
not practice casually. Instead, they practice with strong determination and an awareness 
that they are trying to improve their skills (para. 11).  
 
Adding specifics to what deliberate practice requires, Reamer (2012) suggests professionals take 
a serious look at potential ethical dilemmas or difficult cases that might arise in their practices, 
especially those identified as presenting conflicting duties and values, and consider options and 
consequences for all who are party to a decision. Consulting with other professionals conversant 
in routine outcome monitoring and well-versed in deliberate practice from varying perspectives 
bends “deliberate practice” toward ethical humility and authenticity in improving future 
performance (Goldberg et al., 2016). Professionals in this way are continuously preparing for 
ethical decision-making by increasing their awareness of the relevant variables that play a role in 
the process of making the decision and the responsibility that comes from choosing as one does 
(Rousmaniere, 2016). 
     Conclusion 
 While codes of ethics have clear benefits, they aren’t without limitations. COEs run the 
risk of dogmatizing what's right and wrong and in so doing wall off contestation or the thinking 
process that makes it possible to deal with difficult ethics situations. Further, ethical truths can 
“lose their vivacity” in the panoply of ethics codes faced by professionals—rendering 
accusations of “that’s unethical!” moot. With so many ethics codes governing how professionals 
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comport, claims against counselors as “unethical” shut down discussion and can seem arbitrarily 
enforced. Here, Mill's (1869) argument shows the risks of reducing truth to mere dogma and 
bears relevancy in terms of the potential of COEs to supplant debate. On an anecdotal level, 
counselors may feel bridled by the litany of codes given to unrealistic expectations or seemingly 
lofty quixotic ideas that are out of touch with the reality of the addiction treatment industry or the 
context in which counselors practice. For example, some ethics workshops may entreat 
professionals to file a misconduct report or to speak out if they see something unethical, thereby 
putting themselves in harm’s way. Yet these workshop facilitators are unscrupulously mute on 
how counselors can pragmatically protect themselves against the reality of institutional reprisal 
(e.g., being fired, subjected to bullying supervision, or put on an “employee development” or 
“personal improvement” plan). Furthermore, counselors can become emotively disengaged from 
ethics codes, resulting in ethical reasoning not becoming “habituated” in practice, especially 
when traditional ethics education based on philosophical principles is unlikely to transfer 
seamlessly to workplace practice (Hoyk & Hersey, 2008). 
 There can be an unspoken tension between obedience to ethics codes that are below the 
normal level of consciousness— automatic behavior that follows the duty to “do the right thing” 
as informed by personal values, morals, beliefs, etc., and blind obedience that requires the 
counselor to suppress his or her own conscience regarding a counselor’s primary duty of care, 
despite evidence that things are wrong (Heffernan, 2011). Thus, instead of a fixed code of ethics, 
a “learning base” whereby principles are vaguely proposed and counselors are given the task of 
deciding what they mean, is necessary to assist students in becoming more effective counselors 
(Smythe, 2015).  The kind of ethics training that counselors presently receive simply assumes 
that the COE represents moral and ethical truths that are adequate to the job, and all that is 
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required is application. This is wrong-headed; instead, new counselors should be trained in 
dialogue structured around the patent truth that moral problems are often difficult, and ethical 
dilemmas require answers that can and should be debated (Taleff, 2010). Thus, in preparation for 
the contingencies of real practice in addiction treatment and counseling, it is first suggested that 
our ethics education curriculum quickly moves beyond introduction to the basic standards given 
in the COE and application of those standards to a curriculum with room for and encouragement 
of vigorous debate of every aspect of ethical decision-making. This is similar to what Kultgen 
(1988) envisioned as ethics education for counselors and students in which they are:  
exposed to no-holds-barred debates on the ethical dilemmas of professional 
practice…Students should not only witness debates, but be required to enter into them. 
An informed, practiced, and critical grasp of alternative moral and social perspectives 
should become as integral an element of professional education as technical skill (p. 368).  
 
One potentially useful method of delivering content for ethics competency development would 
engage students in building a code of ethics from the ground up and debating the merits of its 
basis and application against an interesting array of possible ethical dilemmas. 
 Second, as a concrete mode of lifelong learning, frequent and structured “deliberate 
practice” is useful, with the caveat that there is no one timeless answer to how any scenario 
might be dealt with “ethically”. Perhaps deliberate practice could be written into the COE as an 
open-ended commitment to bettering oneself as an addiction professional, where “bettering 
oneself” is acknowledged to be something much more demanding than compliance with stated 
principles.  
 But the salient point here is this: just as improving one’s skill at the piano cannot be 
summarized and conveyed by any set of instructions, neither can improving one’s skill at ethical 
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reasoning be reduced to a set of principles and the instructions for applying them. Ethical 
competency does not come solely from grappling with issues in the abstract, but also from 
decisions made in context, where features of the actual situation may well pull one in different 
and equally valued directions. Ethics competency is more than acculturation into a set of 
principles befitting the profession—it demands factual knowledge from personal case experience 
and research, engagement with peers representing the scope of possible “truths”, and a lifetime 
of practice. And still in all, the “right” choice is nothing more than the one authentically chosen. 
 In closing, it’s worth noting that  
there are numerous instances where ethics breaches are not made by bad people, but by 
good people who have historical patterns of integrity and competence but where systemic 
issues compromise the ability to act ethically, the extrusion of individual staff for ethics 
breaches constitutes a process of scapegoating that individualizes what is in essence an 
agency environmental problem (Van Hoose & Kottler, 1985, p. 6).  
 
Thus, ethics codes may only be as good as the culture of the agency and the behavior of others in 
the organization (e.g., Enron, Wells Fargo), which serve as the “ethical yardstick” by which a 
counselor adapts to “the ecology of ethics across the web of interactions and systems that make 
up the practice environment” (Strom-Gottfried, 2007, pp. 18-19; citing Cohen, 2002, p. 9).  
 In turn, it is virtually a given that there is a pre-existing gap between what the agency 
publicly airs as its ethical commitments (mission statement, goals, objectives, values, ideas, etc.) 
and actual practices and performance (White, 1997). The virtues and values established by the 
COE may be diametrically opposed to the pressures and expectations of the practice environment 
when “doing the right thing” requires the counselor to possess the moral courage to put his or her 
neck on the line and risk termination or career suicide (Murray, 2010; Reamer, 2013). Because of 
this tension, there is a real need for state regulatory authorities, and agencies themselves, to 
conduct ethics inquiries and to catalog undocumented grievances and formal complaints. This 
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should require proactive listening to individual staff member reports, systemic collection of 
information on informal policies, evaluation of de facto treatment protocols and practices, and 
the uncovering and investigation of “hidden ethics reports” (Weston, 2001, p. 308). Also entailed 
would be tracking of any informal socio-cultural subsystems that exist and efforts to understand 
the underlying top-down (management) and horizontal (peer) pressures that beset employees 
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). On the basis of such ethics inquiries and inventories, agencies 
would be rated on their ability to create, encourage, and engage ethical commitment.  
 Ethics is as much a personal–professional issue as an organizational systems issue, but 
programs tend to define ethics as an individual issue rather than an institutional one (White, 
1993). Codes of ethics may guide the conduct of a counselor but contribute little to the 
development of promoting high standards or a strong organizational culture through which all 
members share values related to standards of professional practice, such as exceeding minimal 
ethical standards of comportment and striving for the ideal human character, duties, and 
behaviors (White, 1993). Thus, state regulatory authorities must admonish agencies to establish 
internal mechanisms for addressing ethical issues, instead of passively relying on the COE and/or 
thinking of it solely as an instrument applicable to a select number of staff (i.e., certified 
counselors) and thus as merely a reflection of personal–professional ethics (Weston, 2001). 
Agencies should ask themselves: what tools or methods does the everyday addiction treatment 
program employ to promote ethical values and behavior? Similarly, what sort of feedback 
mechanisms are structured into programs for crucial quality ethics checks at a systems level that 
apply to all staff and can address ethics violations as a systemic issue (see White, 1993; Reamer, 
2000, 2013)? 
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 Accreditors, auditors, and state regulatory authorities must devise an ethics rating system 
for each program and its organizational values and ingrained standards (transcending individual 
staff) somewhat similar to agencies providing credit ratings for companies and organizations 
issuing debt, and their debt instruments, so that external stakeholders and the public can judge 
creditworthiness (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). The desired output would be an ethics report 
card fostering the development of ethical standards and ethical sensitivities that say to all staff 
members, clients, families, stakeholders, and the broader community: “This is who we are. These 
are the standards of practice by which you can judge us. If we fail to meet these standards, we 
expect and ask that you bring this discrepancy to our attention” (White, 1993, p. 22).    
 In sum, this paper has reimagined how COEs might be modified and ethics training 
reformatted, as well as indicating the value of frequent, deliberate practice for ethics discourse 
and professional peer groups. These modifications will assist professionals in the area of 
treatment and counseling. Future papers on professional codes of ethics should look at the 
literature related to cognitive developmental theories, which speak to growth from rigid thinking 
toward cognitive complexity and holistic thinking. From an educational standpoint, cognitive 
developmental theory and moral development are useful conceptual frameworks for structuring 
ethics workshops and classes. Study of how agencies foster ethical behavior in relation to 
decision-making theories and ethics competency development in general will also be instructive 
and is worthy of future exploration. 
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Table: Code of Ethics  
Pros/Strengths/ Maximums Cons/Limitations/ Minimums 
Attempts to ensure…clinicians are not detrimental to 
the profession…[and] will demonstrate sensible regard 
for social mores and expectations of community; 
[gives] grounds for safeguarding professional freedom 
and integrity” (Strom-Gottfried, 2007, p. 10). 
Professionals may consign themselves to rigidly adhere to COE in rote 
mechanical manner as a perceived ethical responsibility; COEs are the 
“lowest common denominators in the norms of persons of ordinary 
conscientiousness with a wide spectrum of prejudices”  (Kultgen, 1988, p. 
225).   
Offers a social, political, cultural, moral, legal, ethical, 
and professional starting place (in progress) for 
calibrating thinking about gray areas of addiction ethics 
(Zur, 2005). 
May be accepted as unquestioned (moral) truth and codes which are 
repeated enough are liable to “becoming the dumbed-down professional 
standard” (Zur, 2005, p. 268);  and consequently, propagating moral 
myths about unethical behavior  Fostering the potential for moral 
grandstanding and the attendant increase in self-righteousness from 
upholding the COE, bespeaking to the virtuous character of the 
professional (Pope, Sonne, & Greene, 2006).  
Ambiguity of codes helps provisions gain wide 
acceptance. Over-specific codes of unethical conduct 
might infer that not listed as ethical.  
Can be read in the abstract and take on fuzzy generalities in wording and 
seeming contradictions in wording; general and vague terms may not be 
taken as intended. 
Offers a structured code with a set of guidelines for 
what is important; enables accountability and a 
mechanism for holding personally and professionally 
responsible conduct. 
Tends to idealize “values of independence, privacy, and isolation over. . . 
values of interconnectedness, mutuality, and interdependence …and give 
mere lip service to cultural diversity” (Zur, 2005, pp. 264-265).  
Serves as a reminder of what should and shouldn’t be; 
…aid[s] what ought to be done in terms of clarifying 
responsibility to client, society and profession” (Strom-
Gottfried, 2007, p. 10). 
Overly focused on counselor at expense of practice environment and 
agency culture.  
Emblematic of a vision, value, and mission statement. Codes apt to be misinterpreted, e.g., confusion between clinical and legal 
decision-making may overlap in ethical decision-making. 
Provides bearing for action and thinking. Codes may impose ethical dogma (e.g., mandate no discrimination as 
opposed to unfair discrimination), intimating the end, not the beginning, 
of ethical consideration of an ethical response to a situation (Pope et al., 
2006, p. 16).  
Intended to slow down thinking and allow practitioners 
to reason differently around the issue at hand. 
COE seems to promote idea that “learning ethical standards, principles, 
and guidelines, along with examples of how they have been applied 
translates into ethical practice” (Pope et al., 2006, p. 16).       
Does not solely propose ironclad rules that must be 
followed to the letter. 
Tendency to overly focus on risk management and obedience to law, this 
obscures relevance and application of humanistic considerations; 
subordinating client interest or priority of humane intervention (Lazarus, 
1994; Zur, 2005, 2017). 
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Table: Continued 
Pros/Strengths/ Maximums* Cons/Limitations/ Minimums*  
Provides insight to recognize and acknowledge ethical 
issues with standards that can be extrapolated to 
different practice situations 
Practitioners may not be well versed in the COE; it may make little 
noticeable difference in the real world of treatment and clinical rounds. 
Signifies a balanced perspective, with no absolute right 
or wrong, but just better or worse solutions. 
Proclivities harbored by staff to under no obligation follow COE (e.g., 
program director, managers, administrators, board members), thus lacks 
teeth and bite.  
Establishes transparency of practice and an ethical floor 
by standardizing a set of common values, expectations, 
and minimum standards. 
Can be treated as window dressing: e.g., simply posted on a wall with 
most significant items in code obscured due to length of verbiage (Unger, 
1982).  
Expresses a compendium of ideals and aspirational goals 
to elevate practice standards.  
Codes can lose meaning and value as practitioners whittle down the COE 
to the most relevant parts and pieces in a self-stylized and pared-down 
version: as many aspects of the COE may be viewed as superfluous, and 
extraneously at odds with personal moral code (Parsons, 2001).  
Reminder of what should be important statements to 
emulate and values to imbue professional identity.  
Ethical integrity diminished when COE fails to distinguish between tattle 
telling, ethical reporting of unethical conduct, and whistle-blowing. 
Help when no clear-cut right or wrong answer comes to 
mind or without guidance (Guy, 1990). 
Often crudely applied (e.g., as all-things-considered or absolute finally 
say) with legal reasons typically used as reference point for why action is 
right or wrong and used to trump ethical codes.  
 Reminder of the important principles and values as 
benchmarks for ethical maturity and professional 
identity.  
COE can be enshrined as “sacred document” over-moralizing ethics with  
"promiscuous use of “unethical” causing ethical blurring and watering 
down the concept of ethical integrity.    
Typically cover the highest ideas of professional conduct 
for self-evaluation and professional boundaries.   
Agency policy and employee job duties supersede COE; not used for 
decision-making, reprimanding, or planning best course of action.  
Ethical codes “establish norms for proper behavior and 
methods to arrive at those behaviors” (Roberts, 2016, p. 
286).  
 
Codes using negative phrasing and compulsion— 
 “shall” and “shall not”—stress consequences without affirmative 
rationale or proof of claim.  
Helps to neutralize personal morals/ethics/values—i.e., 
practitioner emotional baggage carried by clinicians 
(from running amok). 
COEs also seem to discount organizational influences faced by 
practitioner and ignore the fact that some agency’s do not want or value 
ethical leadership.   
Without COEs, practitioners “have no basis for making 
judgments and no way of knowing whether we have 
behaved properly or improperly” (Van Hoose & Kottler, 
1985, p. 170). 
There is no prescription for ethical enforcement at the organizational 
level (fostering breach of ethics).  
 
 
43
Williams: WHAT MAKES ADDICTION ETHICS CODES ETHICAL
Published by SFA ScholarWorks, 2018
 44 
 
Table: Continued 
Pros/Strengths/ Maximums* Cons/Limitations/ Minimums*  
“Protects professionals from government interference 
and legislative regulations; …internal bickering about 
matters clearly delineated within the code 
and…unfounded complaints and egregious claims 
against professionals” (Van Hoose & Kottler, 1985, p. 
11). 
Ethics codes may be taught imperfectly and become learned dogma— 
unclear, difficult to objectify, and with no standardized consensus of 
what it means to be an ethical counselor (Forrest, 2010).  
Makes explicit the virtues and ideal ethical and moral 
standards of a “good counselor” (Weston, 2001). A 
check and balance on the practitioner’s personal 
values/ethics/morals.  
Principles from the code are bound to conflict with basic values and 
ideas harbored by clinicians in disagreement with ethical standards of the 
organization (Weston, 2001). Creates moral vs. ethical pressure 
undermining the good intent of the COE.  
Spells out a number of morally unacceptable and 
unequivocally forbidden behaviors (Guy, 1990).  
Expectations and values expressed by COE may be out of touch with the 
realities of the practice environment “on the ground”, extant literature, 
and scientific research.    
Acts as a check and balance against practitioners’ own 
personal values, ethics, and morals to contemplate 
professional ethics (Fisher, 2016).  
Professional codes may fail to recognize or acknowledge that “patient 
and professional are always in a personal relationship (a relationship 
between persons)” (Greenspan, 1993, p. 199).   
Establishes an ethical floor by standardizing a set of 
common values, expectations, and minimum standards 
(Fisher, 2016).  
Acceptance of professional codes may effectively demonstrate confusion 
with the principles of a COE being morally sound (Pryzwansky & 
Wendt, 1999). 
In practical application, solutions for thorny ethical 
issues yield to professional discretion.     
“Codes may not align with state laws or regulations regarding reporting 
requirements” (Corey et al., 2015, p. 7).  
Helps orientate thinking towards values and 
responsibilities rooted in the identity of the profession. 
Codes inhere ethnocultural bias fused to culture-specific notions of 
professionalism (Lefley, 2002).  
General provisions guard against loopholes for 
misconduct (Unger, 1982). 
Neglects personal moral ideas (which can “evoke higher aspirations than 
the minimum responsivities incumbent on all professionals”) and moral 
relevance of the professional’s personal moral life, resources, and 
obligations to professional responsibilities (Martin, 2000, p. 149).  
Standardizes certain clinical behavior with common 
language and professional agreement on ethical 
decision-making. 
 “COEs are written from the perspective of a particular professional 
group, and does not take into account the needs of other stakeholders 
such as individual consumer or workers. In fact, most mental health 
workers are not even connected to an organization such as the APA so 
for most people such a relativist account doesn’t even matter” (Cutler, 
2002, p. xi).   
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